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I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic liberalism has increased emphasis on contingent 
employment, resulting in a sizable departure from the traditional 
long-term employment model that has been of significant legal and 
social consequence for international industrial relations.1 
 
 1.  See Judy Fudge, The Legal Boundaries of the Employer, Precarious 
Workers and Labour Protection, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR 
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Considerable scholarship illustrates the amplified use of temporary 
employment by multinational corporations struggling to adapt in the 
globalized industrial complex.2 While alternative labor arrangements 
offer management a host of strategic benefits, antiquated domestic 
labor law is statutorily under-inclusive of temporary workers, often 
failing to afford the most fundamental employment rights to this 
vulnerable and burgeoning sector of the workforce.3 Given the 
incongruity between the employment relationship that the National 
Labor Relations Act (“the Act”)4 assumes and the nuanced 
 
LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 295–97 (Guy Davidov & 
Brian Langille eds., 2006) (concluding that the traditional employment model upon 
which the contemporary study of labor relations is based has undergone 
fundamental structural changes in response to globalization). See generally Gillian 
MacNaughton & Diane F. Frey, Decent Work for All: A Holistic Human Rights 
Approach, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV 441, 442–43 (2011) (acknowledging the 
enormous social impact that decades of deregulation, privatization, and 
globalization have had on the vulnerable workforce). 
 2.  See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contingent and Alternative 
Employment Arrangements, February 2005 (July 27, 2005), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm (indicating that 1.8–4.1% of the 
American workforce was engaged in temporary work in February 2005); U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-76, CONTINGENT WORKERS: 
INCOMES AND BENEFITS LAG BEHIND THOSE OF REST OF WORKFORCE 16 (2000), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00076.pdf (demonstrating that 
between 1982 and 1998, the number of temporary jobs rose 577%, making it the 
fastest-growing portion of the U.S. labor market); cf. Kim Van Eyck, Flexibilizing 
Employment: An Overview, INT’L LABOUR ORG. 1–2 (SEED, Working Paper No. 
41, 2003) (reasoning that corporations with an international presence increasingly 
turn to labor market flexibilization to achieve a competitive advantage in an 
environment of rapidly-changing markets).  
 3.  See Guy Davidov, Joint Employer Status in Triangular Employment 
Relationships, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW: GOALS AND 
MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 2–3 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 
2006) (reasoning that by embracing temporary employment, risk traditionally 
absorbed by employers may be “outsourced” to employees); Policies and 
Regulation to Combat Precarious Employment, Bureau for Workers’ Activities, 
INT’L LABOUR ORG. 6 (2011) (warning that weak legislative frameworks and 
“impotent enforcement mechanisms” not only reduce the availability of certain 
rights, but also reduce the likelihood that a temporary employee will be able to 
successfully assert and protect the limited rights that he or she may have). But see 
Special Report: Contingent Workers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2011), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/reports/dunlop/section5.htm (finding that labor 
flexibility, when appropriately regulated, can be a healthy development for 
workers, too, as temporary arrangements promote better work-life balance and 
autonomy at work).  
 4.  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006). 
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employment relationship that practically exists, temporary workers 
elude protective regulation under the Act, often performing the same 
work as long-term workers without the same benefits and safeguards. 
Common features of contingent work include uncertainty as to 
employment duration, ambiguity regarding which employer 
determines the terms and conditions of employment, low wages, 
inadequate benefits, and, most important for purposes of this 
comment, crippling legal and practical obstacles to joining trade 
unions.5 
Particularly salient is the National Labor Relations Board’s 
(“NLRB” or “the Board”) 2004 decision in Oakwood Care Center 
(“Oakwood”), wherein a three-member majority interpreted Section 
9(b) of the Act to read that a bargaining unit incorporating both 
temporary workers supplied by a “supplier employer” (that is, a 
private employment agency) and the user employer’s core employees 
is statutorily impermissible absent consent of both the user and 
supplier employers.6 The consequences of Oakwood on domestic 
labor law are two-fold. First, by conditioning the legality of the 
arrangement on employer consent, Oakwood imposes upon 
temporary employees an elevated burden to accessing collective 
representation guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.7 Further, the 
 
 5.  See Kathleen Barker & Kathleen Christensen, Introduction: Controversy 
and Challenges Raised by Contingent Work Arrangements, in CONTINGENT WORK: 
AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN TRANSITION 4–8 (Kathleen Baker & 
Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998) (noting the diverse degree of control that firms 
have over their employees); Katherine Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical 
Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees 
Without Employers, 27 BERKLEY J. LAB. & EMP. L 251, 253–55 (2006) 
(demonstrating that labor and employment laws do not afford full protection to 
temporary employees, and that statutory under-inclusion impacts a variety of rights 
ranging from collective bargaining to occupational health and safety). 
 6.  See Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. 659, 663 (2004) (expressly 
overruling the Board’s 2000 decision in M.B. Sturgis and holding instead that 
jointly-employed temporary employees seeking to unionize with employees solely 
employed by the “user” employee must, consistent with Section 9 of the National 
Labor Relations Act, demonstrate sufficient mutuality of interest and obtain the 
consent of both the “user” employer and the “supplier” employer).  
 7.  See Bita Rahebi, Comment, Rethinking the National Labor Relations 
Board’s Treatment of Temporary Workers: Granting Greater Access to 
Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1105, 1122–24 (2000) (arguing that the joint-
employer consent doctrine as originally applied in Greenhoot and ultimately 
reaffirmed in Oakwood presents an overwhelming obstacle to temporary employee 
unionization).  
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decision simultaneously affords employers an unqualified 
constructive veto on a temporary worker’s right to unionize such that 
an employee otherwise capable of satisfying the elevated burden may 
still be barred from membership arbitrarily and without just cause.8 
Oakwood is not without its detractors, however, and in June 2013 an 
NLRB regional director ordered an election among temporary 
workers over calls to dismiss the petitions pursuant to the Board’s 
holding in Oakwood.9 
Domestic confusion regarding proper legal treatment of the 
contingent workforce does not, however, exempt the United States 
from obligations under the international labor law framework.10 As a 
signatory to the International Labour Organization (“ILO”), the 
United States has, on the basis of membership alone, undertaken a 
 
 8.  See David A. Recht, Comment, Neither Mutual Aid Nor Protection: How 
Current National Labor Relations Board Practice Denies Temporary Workers 
Their Rights to Organize, 38 CONN. L. REV. 565, 566–67 (2006) (finding that 
Oakwood is irreconcilable with the legislative intent of the Act because the consent 
requirement effectively allows employers to “block a proposed bargaining unit 
without any adjudication through the Board or review by the courts”); cf. Tiffany 
Fonseca, Comment, Collective Bargaining Under the Model of M.B. Sturgis, Inc.: 
Increasing Legal Protections for the Growing Contingent Workforce, 5 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 167, 167–68 (2002) (recalling that the dual-consent requirement 
“kept nearly every temporary employee from collective bargaining in the last 
decade” and predicting that removal of the consent requirement in M.B. Sturgis 
will make it easier for temporary employees to participate in collective 
bargaining).  
 9.  See Decision and Direction of Election, Bergman Bros. Staffing Inc., No. 
05-RC-105509 (June 20, 2013), available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/ 
mamr-993n4c/$File/Bergman.pdf (ordering the representation election of workers 
supplied by a temporary employment agency and finding that if Oakwood were to 
apply in this instance, temporary employees “would effectively be denied any 
opportunity to exercise their statutory rights”); Lisa Milam-Perez, Staffing 
Company Workers Not Temps – At Least as to Agency That Dispatched Them; 
NLRB Regional Director Calls for Election, WOLTERS KLUWER, 
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/staffing-company-workers-
not-temps-at-least-as-to-agency-that-dispatched-them-nlrb-regional-director-calls-
for-election/ (reporting on the regional director’s decision to order an election).  
 10.  See James Atleson et al., INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 57–61 (2008) 
(highlighting that pursuant to the Fundamental Declaration on Principles and 
Rights at Work, ILO Convention No. 87 is so central to the ILO’s mission that, 
unlike the majority of international labor law promulgated at the ILO, the treaty is 
binding and enforceable on the basis of membership alone, regardless of sovereign 
attempts to ratify). 
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binding commitment to guarantee unobstructed associational and 
collective rights to all workers pursuant to ILO Convention No. 87 
on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
(“Convention No. 87”).11 This comment attempts to reconcile the 
Board’s decision in Oakwood with the ILO’s command that all 
workers, without distinction or discrimination whatsoever, shall have 
the right to establish, join, and structure unions of their choosing 
without previous authorization.12 
Part II of this comment surveys the organizational structure and 
substantive mandate of the ILO, and comprehensively reviews ILO 
Convention No. 87.13 Part II then reasons through the Oakwood 
decision and clarifies the Board’s inconsistent application of Section 
9(b) of the Act to temporary workers in M.B. Sturgis, Inc. and Lee 
Hospital.14 Part III comparatively analyzes Convention No. 87 with 
 
 11.  See ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 37 
I.L.M. 1237 (June 19, 1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/ 
standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm (declaring that freedom of association and 
the effective recognition of collective bargaining are so central to the mandate of 
the ILO that Convention Nos. 87 and 98, which address these issues, are binding 
on the basis of membership alone).  
 12.  See ILO Convention Concerning the Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organise art. 2, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter 
ILO Convention No. 87] (“Workers and employers, without distinction 
whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the 
organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without 
previous authorisation.”); see also ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, 
Report in Which the Committee Requests to Be Kept Informed of Development, ¶ 
242, Case No. 2083 (Can.), Rep. No. 324 (Mar. 2001) [hereinafter CFA Case No. 
2083] (“Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 87 provides that all workers ‘without 
distinction whatsoever’ should have the right to organize, which the Committee on 
Freedom of Association has considered to mean that this freedom should be 
guaranteed without discrimination of any kind.”); cf. ILO Committee on Freedom 
of Association, Report in Which the Committee Requests to Be Kept Informed of 
Development, ¶ 754, Case No. 2556 (Colom.), Rep. No. 349 (Mar. 2008) 
[hereinafter CFA Case No. 2556] (recalling that all workers, whether employed 
permanently or temporarily and jointly or solely, must be permitted to join 
organizations of their choosing without distinction whatsoever pursuant to Article 
2 of ILO Convention No. 87). 
 13.  See discussion, infra Part II.A (illustrating the ILO’s tripartite system of 
governance and explaining the ways by which the ILO promulgates, regulates, and 
enforces international labor law and policy); see also discussion, infra Part II.B 
(gauging the protections afforded to workers under ILO Convention No. 87, and 
explaining how they apply to the United States). 
 14.  See discussion, infra Part II.C (chronicling the Board’s conflicting 
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the Board’s 2004 ruling in Oakwood, ultimately concluding that the 
decision is textually and jurisprudentially inconsistent with the 
United States’ obligations under the ILO.15 In closing, Part IV 
encourages the U.S. Senate to ratify ILO Convention No. 181 on 
Private Employment Agencies and advocates returning to well-
settled Section 9(b) precedent pursuant to M.B. Sturgis.16 Embracing 
these recommendations would promote compliance with 
international labor law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Domestically, rapid growth in temporary employment has 
fractured the legal foundation upon which labor law typologies 
apply.17 This fracture is evidenced most clearly by the Board’s 
inconsistency on the central issue presented in Oakwood: whether the 
legislative intent of Section 9(b) of the Act is achieved by allowing 
temporary employees to unionize with solely employed employees as 
a matter of unqualified right, or if structured bargaining is better 
preserved by requiring employer consent.18 ILO Convention No. 87 
 
jurisprudence on the proper application of Section 9(b) of the Act to temporary 
workers in Greenhoot, Lee Hospital, M.B. Sturgis, and Oakwood Care Center).  
 15.  See discussion, infra Part III (finding that by interpreting Section 9(b) of 
the Act to require the consent of both the user employer and the supplier employer 
before a jointly-employed temporary worker can unionize with solely-employed 
employees of the user employer, the Board allows employers to impermissibly 
interfere with the right to form and join unions as guaranteed by ILO Convention 
No. 87 and made binding on the United States under the Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work). 
 16.  See discussion, infra Part IV.A. 
 17.  See Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relationship, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1527, 1531 (1996) (opining that American labor law assumes a long-
term, stable relationship between employee and firm, and concluding that as firms 
rearrange and downsize, many temporary employees become vulnerable to 
exploitation); Stone, supra note 5, at 254 (suggesting that labor law governing 
collective bargaining and individual employment rights are dependent on the 
assumption of long-term employment relationships, and reasoning that 
decentralization of production has left many contingent workers without a safety 
net); see, e.g., The Dunlop Comm’n on the Future of Worker-Management 
Relations: Final Report, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE 61–64 
(1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1004&context=key_workplace (critiquing current labor and tax laws as 
creating incentives for employers to evade legal obligations under a guise of 
promoting flexibility and efficiency).  
 18.  See Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B 659, 661–63 (2004) (reconsidering 
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provides a more developed and accessible framework to address this 
issue.19 To properly juxtapose the United States’ international legal 
obligations with the Board’s holding in Oakwood, one must first 
appreciate the broad commands of the Convention and the 
conflicting jurisprudence of the Board.20 What follows is a 
comprehensive review of both, as well as a brief primer on the 
mandate of the ILO.21 
A. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND SUBSTANTIVE 
MANDATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 
The origins of the ILO can be traced to international unrest in the 
wake of the First World War.22  Labor tranquility was deemed central 
to preserving global peace, economic stability, and social justice.23  
Given these concerns, Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles created a 
 
the central issue presented in M.B. Sturgis); cf. Harold Datz, When One Board 
Reverses Another: A Chief Counsel’s Perspective, 1 AM. U. LABOR & EMP. L.F. 
67, 68–69 (2011) (providing perspective on the statutory basis for a seated Board 
reversing a predecessor, and chronicling instances of inconsistency on a variety of 
labor law issues).  
 19.  See Aaron B. Sukert, Note, Marionettes of Globalization: A Comparative 
Analysis of Legal Protections for Contingent Workers in the International 
Community, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 431, 435–37 (2000) (finding 
considerable discrepancies in applying international labor standards to contingent 
workers in Europe, Japan, and the United States, specifically between protections 
afforded by national regulation and those provided by international labor law). 
 20.  Compare discussion, infra Part II.B (defining the United States’ 
international legal obligation to provide unqualified and unobstructed access to the 
freedom of association pursuant to ILO Convention No. 87), with discussion, infra 
Part II.C (explaining the broad discretionary authority vested in the Board under 
Section 9(b) of the Act and the resulting interpretive conflict stemming therefrom 
relating to the freedom of association of temporary workers).  
 21.  See discussion, infra Part II.A (analyzing the historical origins, 
organizational structure, and substantive mandate of the ILO).  
 22.  See JEAN-MICHEL SERVAIS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 
(ILO) 15 (Roger Blanpain ed., 2011) (pointing out that international decision-
makers viewed unchecked labor revolutionaries in vulnerable post-World War I 
Eastern Europe as a risk to international peace and stability, so much so that 
interested parties lobbied for the creation of an international institution to regulate 
and oversee such matters). 
 23.  See STEVE HUGHES & NIGEL HAWORTH, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
ORGANIZATION (ILO): COMING IN FROM THE COLD 5–6 (Thomas G. Weiss ed., 
2011) (chronicling generally the international concerns spawning the creation of 
the ILO following World War I).  
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permanent international body dedicated to labor protection.24 
Currently, the ILO exists as the specialized agency of the United 
Nations responsible for strengthening the dialogue on matters of 
labor relations and employment law.25 Characterized by its unique 
tripartite decision-making apparatus, the ILO’s governing body 
affords equal voice to employer groups, trade unions, and 
government delegates in an attempt to establish an experiential, 
ideological, and regional basis for international decision-making.26 
This body governs through promulgation of international labor 
standards taking form in “Conventions” and “Recommendations.”27 
The ILO is also empowered as an adjudicatory, supervisory, and 
investigative mechanism.28 Of central importance to this comment is 
 
 24.  See SERVAIS, supra note 22, at 15–16 (citing the Treaty of Versailles as 
promoting the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a 
maximum working day and week; the regulation of the labour supply; the 
prevention of unemployment; the provision of an adequate living wage; the 
protection of the worker against sickness, disease, and injury arising out of his 
employment; the protection of children, young persons, and women; provision for 
old age and injury; protection of the interests of workers when employed in 
countries other than their own; recognition of the principle of freedom of 
association; and the organization of vocational and technical education and other 
measures).  
 25.  See About the ILO, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-
the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (defining the main objectives 
and mission of the ILO as promoting rights at work, encouraging decent 
employment opportunities, and enhancing social protection for workers globally).  
 26.  See HÉCTOR BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR ORGANIZATION: THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SYSTEM AND BASIC 
HUMAN RIGHTS 10–11 (1996) (contending that, because of its tripartism, ILO 
decisions possess a “unique authority” and “realism” that is absent from most U.N. 
Specialized Agencies and other purely governmental organizations); Social 
Dialogue, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-
work-agenda/social-dialogue/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) 
(advocating tripartism as a method for incorporating experiential knowledge of 
governments, unions, and employer groups on matters of labor and employment 
law).  
 27.  See ATLESON ET AL., supra note 10, at 55–56 (explaining that conventions 
are the substantive legal instruments of the ILO that become binding upon 
ratification, and that Recommendations, while not traditional “law,” supplement 
conventions by providing interpretive and practical guidance to the ILO 
membership).  
 28.  See BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ ET AL., supra note 26, at 101–05 (discussing 
the institutional mechanisms used to resolve disputes amongst members, 
investigate alleged instances of non-compliance, and supervise implementation of 
ILO instruments domestically).  
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the Committee on Freedom of Association (“the Committee” or 
“CFA”), which adjudicates, alleged violations of Convention No. 
87.29 
B. DISSECTING ILO CONVENTION NO. 87 AND THE FUNDAMENTAL 
DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK 
Convention No. 87 recognizes the freedom of association and the 
right to bargain collectively as fundamental human rights.30 It is the 
principle treaty regulating international labor relations, and is widely 
considered a seminal instrument of the ILO without which the 
organization would be incapable of effectuating its mission.31 
Interestingly, the United States has not ratified the Convention.32 
 
 29.  See id. at 101–02 (characterizing the Committee on Freedom of 
Association as a “specialized body” tasked with examining complaints against 
member states and developing precedential jurisprudence clarifying the principles 
and standards of ILO Convention No. 87); Committee on Freedom of Association, 
INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-
international-labour-standards/committee-on-freedom-of-association/lang--
en/index.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (“[I]n 1951 the ILO set up the Committee 
on Freedom of Association (CFA) for the purpose of examining complaints about 
violations of freedom of association, whether or not the country concerned had 
ratified the relevant conventions.”).  
 30.  See BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ ET AL., supra note 26, at 165–67 (comparing 
ILO Convention No. 87 with existing international human rights instruments such 
as the Treaty of Versailles, the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, each of which codified the freedom of association 
and right to bargain collectively as fundamental human rights).  
 31.  See ATLESON ET AL., supra note 10, at 57–58 (recognizing ILO 
Convention No. 87 as integral to the purpose, mandate, and mission of the ILO); 
cf. ILO Mandate, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/ 
mandate.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (“The ILO formulates international labour 
standards in the form of Conventions and Recommendations setting minimum 
standards of basic labour rights: freedom of association, the right to organize, 
collective bargaining, abolition of forced labour, equality of opportunity and 
treatment, and other standards regulating conditions across the entire spectrum of 
work related issues.”). 
 32.  See Ratifications for the United States, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUN
TRY_ID:102871 (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (cataloging the United States’ 
ratification of Fundamental Conventions, Governance Conventions, and Technical 
Conventions, and finding that the United States has not ratified ILO Convention 
No. 87); see also ATLESON ET AL., supra note 10, at 55–56 (offering three reasons 
for the United States’ low ratification rates, including that (1) U.S. law and practice 
substantially comply with the Convention, making ratification unnecessary; (2) 
principles of federalism grant states jurisdiction over many aspects of labor law 
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To combat chronic non-ratification by member states, the ILO 
unanimously adopted the Fundamental Declaration on Principles and 
Rights at Work in 1998, codifying the freedom of association and the 
right to organize as core international labor standards.33 Although the 
effectiveness and scope of the Declaration are often the subjects of 
criticism, the Declaration’s impact as a matter of international labor 
law is clear.34 Pursuant to the Declaration, signatories to the ILO 
have, on the basis of membership alone, a binding obligation “to 
respect, to promote, and to realize” the freedom of association and 
the right to bargain collectively.35 The Declaration is of considerable 
importance because it confers constitutional status upon Convention 
No. 87, binding non-ratifying members—including the United 
States—to its terms and making susceptible all member states to 
investigative and enforcement action at the ILO’s Committee on 
 
that ILO Convention No. 87 addresses; and (3) ratification could require changing 
existing federal law, which is squarely within the purview of Congress). 
 33.  See HUGHES & HAWORTH, supra note 23, at 51 (listing the “core labor 
standards” adopted by the International Labour Conference’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work as including the freedom of 
association and effective recognition of collective bargaining, the elimination of 
forced labor, the elimination of child labor, and the elimination of employment 
discrimination such that signatories have a binding obligation “to respect, to 
promote, and to realize in good faith” such standards); see also ILO Director 
General, The ILO, Standard Setting and Globalization (1997), available at 
http://www.actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/law/ilodg.htm 
(viewing adoption of the Declaration as an attempt to continuously effectuate the 
mandate of the ILO in the wake of globalization).  
 34.  See, e.g., Philip Alston & James Heenan, Shrinking the International 
Labor Code: An Unintended Consequence of the 1998 ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work?, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 
235 (2004) (criticizing the Declaration as merely promoting the core labor 
standards as opposed to creating firm legal obligations); Lance A. Compa, Core 
Labour Rights: Promise and Peril, 9 INT’L UNION RTS. 20, 21 (2002) (discrediting 
the core labor standards approach as an ineffective narrowing of international labor 
law that creates tiers of rights suggesting that certain rights are more important 
than others).  
 35.  See generally ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, supra note 11 (codifying as “Core Conventions” ILO Conventions No. 87 
on Free Association, No. 98 on Collective Bargaining, No. 29 on Forced Labor, 
No. 138 on Child Labor, No. 100 on Equal Pay for Equal Work, and No. 111 on 
Employment Discrimination); ILO, The International Labour Organization’s 
Fundamental Conventions, 9–10 (2002), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/ 
groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_095895.pdf. 
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Freedom of Association.36 
1. ILO Convention No. 87: Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organize Convention (1948) 
An instrument comprehensive in scope, Convention No. 87 
governs the fundamental right of workers “without distinction 
whatsoever” to join trade unions of their choosing  
without previous authorization.”37 
Article 2 establishes the substantive right to free association 
pursuant to three interdependent clauses.38 First, the “without 
distinction whatsoever” clause emphasizes the universal applicability 
of the Convention, and guarantees all workers access to protected 
rights without discrimination of any type as to race, sex, religion, 
nationality, occupation, or political opinion.39 When interpreting this 
clause, the Committee on Freedom of Association categorically 
prohibits differential allocation of protected rights on the basis of 
these characteristics. Second, the “join organizations of their own 
choosing” clause mandates that decisional autonomy be practically 
exercisable and fully respected in law and in fact.40 Beyond 
 
 36.  See ATLESON ET AL., supra note 10, at 57 (explaining that the core 
Conventions were so integral to the mandate and mission of the ILO that 
membership alone creates a binding obligation to comply with the instruments, and 
that the binding-on-the-basis-of-membership scheme allows members to file 
complaints for violations of the treaty against members who, but for the 
Declaration, would not be subject to the Conventions for failure to ratify).  
 37.  ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 12, art. 2.  
 38.  See Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions of the Freedom of 
Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 45, 
57, 65 (5th ed. 2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ 
@ed_norm/@normes/documents/publication/wcms_090632.pdf [hereinafter 
Digest of Decisions (2006)] (segmenting Committee decisions on the basis of the 
three clauses).  
 39.  See International Labour Conference, Report IV (1): Organisations of 
Rural Workers and Their Role in Economic and Social Development, 6, 60th Sess. 
(1975) [hereinafter ILO Report IV(1)] (accepting that the Convention applies to all 
workers who earn a wage by means of selling individual labor); International 
Labour Conference, Report III (Part 4B): Freedom of Association and Collective 
Bargaining, ¶ 45 (1994) [hereinafter ILO Report III (Part 4B)] (indicating that 
discriminatorily allocating rights protected and afforded under Convention No. 87 
on the basis of race, national origin, religion, political opinion, sex, or employment 
status is impermissible).  
 40.  See Digest of Decisions (2006), supra note 38, ¶ 310. 
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preserving an employee’s right to choose amongst competing 
representative organizations, the Committee incorporates within this 
clause the right of workers to freely structure and compose those 
organizations as they deem fit.41 Finally, the “without previous 
authorization” clause protects against unduly burdensome 
prerequisites to trade union membership amounting, in practice, to 
insurmountable obstacles to free association.42 
C. MAKING SENSE OF THE BOARD’S INCONSISTENT SECTION 9(B) 
JURISPRUDENCE RELATING TO TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES 
Congress vests considerable discretionary authority in the Board to 
determine whether a petitioned-for unit is compositionally 
“appropriate” for collective bargaining.43 Section 9(b) of the Act 
provides that the Board shall decide in each case whether, “in order 
to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising rights 
guaranteed by this Act,” the unit “appropriate for collective 
bargaining” shall be the employer unit, plant unit, craft unit, or 
subdivision thereof.44 Congressional guidance is limited, and the 
 
 41.  See CFA Case No. 2556, supra note 12, ¶ 754 (interpreting the “join 
organizations of their own choosing” clause of Article 2 of Convention No. 87 to 
include the right of workers to structure and compose unions as they see fit). 
 42.  See Digest of Decisions (2006), supra note 38, ¶ 272 (permitting 
administrative formalities to union accreditation but providing that “such 
requirements must not be such as to be equivalent in practice to previous 
authorization, or as to constitute such an obstacle to the establishment of an 
organization that they amount in practice to outright prohibition”). 
 43.  See N.L.R.B. v. Action Auto., 469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985) (“Section 9(b) of 
the Act vests in the Board authority to determine ‘the unit appropriate for purposes 
of collective bargaining.’ The Board’s discretion in this area is broad, reflecting 
Congress’ recognition ‘of the need for flexibility in shaping the bargaining unit to 
the particular case.’”) (citation omitted); see also Recht, supra note 8, at 572–73 
(concluding that a literal reading of Section 9(b) gives the Board considerable 
latitude and minimal guidance on how to answer the dispositive question of 
whether the unit, as petitioned for, can adequately represent the interests of the 
workers included). 
 44.  See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2006) (granting the 
Board authority to structure units for collective bargaining in a manner consistent 
with the aims of the Act). See generally Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, 
“Community of Interest” Test in NLRB Determination of Appropriateness of 
Employee Bargaining Unit, 90 A.L.R. FED. 16 (1988) (accumulating Section 9(b) 
case law controlling the Board’s appropriateness determinations in a variety of 
employment contexts, and listing factors relevant to a “community of interest” 
inquiry).  
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majority of criteria used to make propriety determinations have been 
spelled out jurisprudentially.45 
Traditionally, structuring bargaining units is a straightforward 
pursuit dependent on workers sharing a “community of interest” such 
that the unit will simultaneously “serve the Act’s purpose of effective 
collective bargaining” and be “relatively free of conflicts of interest” 
amongst its members.46 Though not exhaustive, similarity in hours, 
wages, benefits, skills, supervision, and terms of employment are 
most indicative of mutual interest.47 By limiting unit composition on 
these factors, the Board protects employers and employees against 
fragmented bargaining.48 
Although the “community of interest” methodology is widely 
accepted in bilateral employment settings, the Board is divided on 
the question of whether commonality of interest is the proper Section 
9(b) “appropriateness” standard for temporary workers in joint 
 
 45.  See Fonseca, supra note 8, at 175–76 (interpreting Section 9(b) of the Act 
to grant broad discretion to the Board to compose appropriate bargaining units 
while, at the same time, failing to provide applicable standards by which propriety 
is governed).  
 46.  Cf. M.B. Sturgis, Inc. 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1305 (2000) (conducting a 
contemporary Section 9(b) community of interest analysis by applying Kalamazoo 
Paper Box Co., Swift & Co., and other relevant Board precedent). Compare 
Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137 (1962) (listing factors 
included in a Section 9(b) community of interest analysis and finding substantial 
discrepancy), with Swift & Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1391, 1393 (1961) (listing factors 
included in a Section 9(b) community of interest analysis and finding substantial 
mutuality). 
 47.  See Michael J. Hely, The Impact of Sturgis on Bargaining Power for 
Contingent Workers in the U.S. Labor Market, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 295, 
312–13 (2003) (indicating that among the many factors considered in a Section 
9(b) community of interest analysis, basic features of employment, such as 
earnings, job functions, and skills, are weighted most heavily).  
 48.  See Joy Vaccaro, Temporary Workers Allowed to Join the Unions: A 
Critical Analysis of the Impact of M.B. Sturgis Decision, 16 J. CIV. RIGHTS & 
ECON. DEV. 489, 494–95 (2002) (reasoning that because overly broad bargaining 
structure would impose practical limitations of effective collective bargaining, the 
interests of management and the workforce are better served by a bargaining 
process that categorizes interests). But see Eric Rosenfeld, N.L.R.B. Restores 
Representation Rights to Temps., N.Y.L.J., Sep. 25, 2000, at 3 (criticizing the 
Board’s application of the community of interest test to temporary workers in M.B. 
Sturgis, arguing that because it fails to recognize inherent asymmetry between 
fulltime and temporary workers, the test inadequately protects associational 
freedoms of these workers).  
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employer, or “triangular,” relationships.49 The Board’s jurisprudence 
on this issue has fluctuated widely, and competing approaches are 
discussed below. 
1. Greenhoot, Inc. (1973) and Lee Hospital (1990): Origins of the 
Dual Consent Requirement 
Greenhoot, Inc. (“Greenhoot”) is universally perceived as the 
foundation for the Lee Hospital and Oakwood Care Center decisions, 
though there is considerable debate as to the extent that the latter 
cases deviated from the former.50 In Greenhoot, the Board found that 
a petitioned-for unit composed of employees working for the same 
company at fourteen separate locations under fourteen separate 
employers was a multiemployer unit under the Act.51 Consistent with 
the Act, the Board held that a multiemployer unit would not be 
appropriate for bargaining absent consent of each employer.52  The 
Greenhoot decision was concerned only with multiemployer 
bargaining, and left untouched the Board’s joint employer precedent, 
which accepted units composed of commonly interested temporary 
 
 49.  See Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1966) (stating that “the 
touchstone of an appropriate bargaining unit is the finding that all of its members 
have a common interest in the terms and conditions of employment”). But see 
generally Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. 659 (2004) (holding that the 
community of interest test is relevant, but not determinative in multilateral 
employment contexts). 
 50.  See Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. at 659; Lee Hosp., 300 N.L.R.B. 
947, 948 (1990) (justifying each holding on precedent set by Greenhoot that stood 
for the proposition that temporary workers are prohibited from membership in a 
unit of fulltime employees of the user employer absent consent of both the user and 
supplier employer). Compare Rahebi, supra note 7, at 1124 (arguing that the 
extension of Greenhoot in Lee Hospital and Oakwood Care Center is inconsistent 
with the Board’s traditional Section 9(b) jurisprudence and was not authorized 
under any reading of Greenhoot), with Hely, supra note 47, at 296 (criticizing the 
Board’s decision in M.B. Sturgis as a “historic departure” from settled Section 9(b) 
precedent as established in Greenhoot and Lee Hospital).  
 51.  See Greenhoot, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 250, 251 (1973) (reasoning that to 
preserve the Act’s command that units be composed to serve principles of effective 
bargaining, separate bargaining units at each of the fourteen locations would be 
appropriate). 
 52.  See id. (holding that the Act prohibits multiemployer bargaining to the 
extent that the parties have not stipulated to the matter); cf. Fonseca, supra note 8, 
at 175–76 (understanding the Board’s avoidance of multiemployer bargaining as a 
method of ensuring that unrelated and distinct employers would not be bound by 
the same union contract). 
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and regular employees.53 
In 1990, the Board extended Greenhoot to the joint-employer 
setting.54 In Lee Hospital, the Board reviewed a regional director’s 
order that a petitioned-for unit of certified registered nurse 
anesthetists (“CRNAs”) jointly employed by Lee Hospital and 
Anesthesiology Associates, Inc. was not appropriate for bargaining 
under Section 9(b) of the Act.55 On review, the Board adopted a new 
framework for determining the propriety of joint employer units. 
Breaking from traditional Section 9(b) precedent, it held, similarly to 
multiemployer units in Greenhoot, that such units were prohibited 
without employer consent.56 The Board announced that joint-
employer status, not mutuality of interest, was determinative.57 Under 
Lee Hospital, two employers that can achieve joint employer status 
by showing codetermination of matters meaningfully impacting the 
employment relationship are able to limit union influence by 
withholding consent on a temporary worker’s ability to join an 
existing unit.58 
 
 53.  See, e.g., Sun-Maid Growers of California v. N.L.R.B., 618 F.2d 56, 59 
(9th Cir. 1980) (holding, post-Greenhoot, that as a joint-employer of temporary 
employees supplied by a private staffing agency, Sun-Maid and the staffing agency 
had a duty to bargain with a unit consisting of both temporary and fulltime 
workers). 
 54.  See Lee Hosp., 300 N.L.R.B. at 948 (reasoning that, pursuant to 
Greenhoot, “the Board does not include employees in the same unit if they do not 
have the same employer”).  
 55.  See id. at 947–48 (describing that the regional director refused to approve 
the Board because the CRNAs lacked sufficient mutuality of interest with existing 
members of the unit). 
 56.  See id. at 948 (citing Greenhoot for the proposition that “the joint 
employer issue must be resolved to determine whether a separate CRNA unit is 
appropriate . . . because, as a general rule, the Board does not include employees in 
the same unit if they do not have the same employer, absent employer consent”). 
 57.  See id. (adopting the regional director’s ultimate decision, but refuting his 
logic, instead determining that the joint-employer issue, not the community of 
interest issue, would determine whether the CRNAs could join the unit as a matter 
of unqualified right) (citing TLI Inc., 271 N.L.R.B 798 (1984); Laerco 
Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984)). 
 58.  See Rahebi, supra note 7, at 1115 (stating that Lee Hospital’s 
interpretation of joint-employer status incentivizes joint-employers to use this 
power strategically to prevent employees from organizing); cf. Recht, supra note 8, 
at 582 (“Lee Hospital got it wrong, and in doing so deprived temporary workers of 
any practical ability to exercise their right to organize under the Act.”). 
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2. M.B. Sturgis (2000): Resurrecting Mutuality of Interest and the 
Unqualified Right to Organize 
Following Lee Hospital, the temporary employment phenomenon 
became cause for global concern, and the Board, recognizing the 
economic realities of alternative labor arrangements, stressed that 
current law effectively denied temporary workers representation.59 
Laying the foundation for its reversal, the Board reconsidered Lee 
Hospital under a new majority in M.B. Sturgis, Inc. (“M.B. 
Sturgis”).60 There, the Board reviewed an order that fifteen 
temporarily-supplied employees jointly employed by M.B. Sturgis 
and Interim, Inc. could not be included in the existing M.B. Sturgis 
bargaining unit because Interim withheld consent pursuant to Lee 
Hospital.61 The Board overruled Lee Hospital, holding instead that a 
unit composed of temporary workers jointly employed by a user 
employer and a supplier employer and employees who are solely 
employed by the user employer is statutorily appropriate without 
employer consent.62 
The Board instituted a two-part test for analyzing these issues 
going forward. As a threshold matter, the Board first considered 
whether the user employer and the supplier employer are joint-
 
 59.  See M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1298 (2000) (“[A] growing 
number of employees who are part of what is commonly described as the 
‘contingent work force’ are being effectively denied representational rights 
guaranteed them under the National Labor Relations Act.”). 
 60.  See id. (noting that Greenhoot and Lee Hospital were decided before the 
growth of temporary employment arrangements and that the opinions required 
reconsideration in light of new evidence illustrating the economic realities of such 
arrangements); cf. Susan N. Houseman, Why Employers Use Flexible Staffing 
Arrangements: Evidence from an Establishment Survey, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 149, 149 (2001) (surveying employers to determine which companies are 
using temporary employees and why they are turning to alternative labor 
arrangements).  
 61.  See M.B. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1298–1300 (reasoning that regardless of 
the fact that the temporarily-supplied employees performed similar tasks as M.B. 
Sturgis employees under common supervision, so the regional director’s decision 
was consistent with Lee Hospital). 
 62.  See id. at 1304–05 (refuting in its entirety the Board’s logic in Lee 
Hospital and holding instead that “a unit composed of employees who are jointly 
employed by a user employer and a supplier employer, and employees who are 
solely employed by the user employer, is permissible under the statute without the 
consent of the employers”). 
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employers.63 Two employers jointly employ the same workers if, 
through “substantial day-to-day control over [the] employees,” each 
codetermines terms and conditions of employment.64 Next, the Board 
considered whether the employees seeking inclusion in the unit share 
sufficient mutuality of interest with the unit’s existing members 
under the community of interest test.65 Under M.B. Sturgis, a 
temporary employee, who demonstrates that she is jointly employed 
and commonly interested, possesses an unqualified right to join the 
unit, notwithstanding employer resistance.66 
3. Oakwood Care Center (2004) Reversing M.B. Sturgis, and 
Current Section 9(b) Interpretation 
Following a shift in power during the Bush administration, 
observers believed M.B. Sturgis was ripe for reconsideration by the 
 
 63.  See id. at 1301 (requiring, as a matter of logic, that the joint-employer 
determination operate as a threshold question because if the user and the supplier 
employer are not found to be joint-employers, any unit including employees of 
both employers would be a multiemployer unit whose propriety is conditioned 
entirely on employer consent pursuant to the Act).  
 64.  See id. (holding that “[u]nder current Board precedent, to establish that two 
or more employers are joint employers, the entities must share or codetermine 
matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment”); see also 
N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117, 1124 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding 
that when two employers have such control over employees that both share or 
codetermine essential terms and conditions of employment, a joint-employer 
relationship exists); cf. Rahebi, supra note 7, at 1117 (indexing the factors 
considered in a joint-employer analysis, including: (1) supervision; (2) hiring and 
firing authority; (3) establishment of rules and conditions; (4) compensation and 
benefits methodology; and (5) allocating responsibilities). 
 65.  Cf. Berea Pub. Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 516, 517 (reasoning that some variance 
in terms and conditions of employment does not necessarily prohibit a finding of 
common interest, but that in certain instances, separate bargaining units will be 
appropriate). See generally Rahebi, supra note 7, at 1105 (noting that jointly 
employed temporary employees must be granted membership within a user 
employer’s unit if the two groups share a community of interest under traditional 
Section 9(b) jurisprudence). 
 66.  M.B. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1308 (“We hold today that consent 
requirements for multiemployer bargaining among separate and independent 
employers do not apply to units that combine jointly employed and solely 
employed employees of a single user employer. We will apply traditional 
community of interest factors to decide if such units are appropriate. For all of the 
reasons set forth in this decision, we overrule Lee Hospital to the extent it is 
inconsistent with our decision today.”).  
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now Republican Board.67 In 2004, the Board took up Oakwood, 
wherein a regional director acting pursuant to M.B. Sturgis approved 
a unit of employees solely employed by Oakwood Care Center and 
workers jointly employed by Oakwood and N&W Staffing Agency.68 
The new majority expressly overruled M.B. Sturgis, characterizing 
the decision as irreconcilable with the legislative intent of Section 
9(b).69 The Board returned to the dual consent doctrine as 
conceptualized in Lee Hospital and held that units combining solely 
and jointly employed workers are multiemployer units that are 
statutorily appropriate only upon the consent of the user and supplier 
employer.70 Neither Oakwood Care Center nor N&W consented to 
the arrangement, and the petition was dismissed.71 
Similar to Lee Hospital, the Oakwood decision spawned a variety 
of literature, some supportive, most critical.72 Given that Oakwood 
leaves open the possibility of temporary workers organizing their 
respective private employment agency, the decision, at least 
debatably, comports as a matter of law with the Section 7 Rights of 
 
 67.  See Hely, supra note 47, at 297 (predicting that in the early 2000s M.B. 
Sturgis would be reversed by Bush appointees prone to siding with management in 
labor disputes).  
 68.  See Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. 659, 659 (2004) (describing that 
some of the employees were solely employed by Oakwood, and that there was no 
dispute that the remaining employees were jointly employed by Oakwood and 
N&W pursuant to the Board’s joint-employer precedent). 
 69.  See id. at 661–62 (recalling that the plain meaning of Section 9(b) endorses 
four types of bargaining units—employer, craft, plant, or subdivision—and that 
any other arrangement, specifically a unit of temporary and permanent employees, 
is permissible only upon employer consent). But see id. at 663–65 (Liebman, M. & 
Walsh, M., dissenting) (reasoning that Section 9(b) “describes the source of the 
bargaining unit, not the source of its members” and therefore considers appropriate 
a unit encompassing all of an employer’s workers).  
 70.  See id. at 662–63 (criticizing the policy implications of bargaining unit 
composition under the M.B. Sturgis model as giving rise to significant conflicts of 
interest and failing to adequately protect employee rights). 
 71.  See id. at 663 (reasoning that to hold otherwise would promote fragmented 
bargaining in violation of the plain meaning of Section 9(b)). 
 72.  See Paul H. Derrick, Unions Now Able to Organize Temporary Workers, 
12 S.C. LAW 15, 16–17 (2001); Hely, supra note 47, at 296. But see Fonseca, supra 
note 8, at 177; Charles J. Morris, A Blueprint for Reform of the National Labor 
Relations Act, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 517, 562–63 (2005); Rahebi, supra note 7, at 
1113–14; Recht, supra note 8, at 587–88; Vaccaro, supra note 48, at 502 (refuting 
the interpretation of Section 9(b) adopted by the Board in both Lee Hospital and 
Oakwood Care Center). 
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Employees.73 Oakwood’s detractors, however, suggest that, as a 
matter of fact, organizing staffing agencies is problematic, and that 
the decision forecloses any prospects of real and meaningful 
collective representation.74 Temporary workers tend to be 
geographically dispersed and of varied interests, often working 
unrelated jobs of marginal physical proximity.75 With this in mind, 
many argue that the organizational plausibility and representative 
capacity of the temporary agency unit is considerably limited 
compared to that of the user employer unit.76 Beyond consequences 
for temporary workers, some perceive Oakwood as potentially 
having lasting effects on the long-term stability and prosperity of 
unionized private employment agencies.77 David Recht indicates that 
 
 73.  See Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. at 663 (finding the Board’s decision 
consistent with the Section 7 Rights of Employees under the Act, given that, as a 
matter of law, temporary employees may exercise such rights at their respective 
staffing agencies, even if the ruling forecloses upon their ability to exercise such 
rights at the user employer’s workplace); cf. National Labor Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (conferring upon employees the right to establish and join 
unions, and to collectively bargain through representatives of the membership’s 
choosing). But see Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. at 669 (Liebmann, M. & 
Walsh, M., dissenting) (“The majority, then, seems to have gone out of its way to 
make it impossible for joint employees to exercise their Section 7 rights 
effectively.”). 
 74.  Katherine V.W. Stone, A Labor Law for the Digital Era: The Future of 
Labor and Employment Law in the United States, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 697 (K.G. Dau-Schmidt, Seth Harris & Orly Lobe eds., 
2009) (“Agency temporary workers are dispersed and have little contact with each 
other. Thus, as a practical matter, temporary workers lack representation or a 
collective voice.”); cf. Fonseca, supra note 8, at 179 (reasoning that, as a matter of 
logic, temporary employee bargaining under the dual-consent regime is 
dysfunctional given that virtually no employees have succeeded in achieving 
consent). 
 75.  See Rahebi, supra note 7, at 1115 (characterizing an organization of 
temporary employees of a single staffing agency as inherently weak because the 
employees work in different places, have unrelated responsibilities, are of varied 
education and skill, turnover at high rates, and do not share uniform concerns or 
priorities). 
 76.  See id. at 1113–15; Recht, supra note 8, at 567; Vaccaro, supra note 48, at 
504 (suggesting that even should a group of temporary employees overcome 
hurdles to organizing at the agency, the unit will be fragmented, weak, and 
ineffective) (citing Sturgis 2000 N.L.R.B Lexis 546, at 54).  
 77.  See Rahebi, supra note 7, at 1114 (citing Malbaff Landscape, in which the 
Board held that it was not an unfair labor practice for a user employer to terminate 
a contract with a supplier employer merely because temporary employees had 
unionized the supplier employer, to support the proposition that employers may 
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instead of paying increased wages and benefits “that would likely 
result from the collective bargaining agreement” with a unionized 
private employment agency, the user employer may simply, 
consistent with the Act, terminate its contract with the agency and 
“seek a union-free staffing agency to supply its temporary 
employees.”78 Regardless, the decision remains good law under the 
Obama Board, or lack thereof.79 
III. ANALYSIS 
Ideally, squaring the Board’s interpretation of Section 9(b) in 
Oakwood with the sweeping commands of Convention No. 87 would 
involve a two-step inquiry measuring both textual and jurisprudential 
compliance. However, the substantive, rights-granting provisions of 
Convention No. 87 are limited, thus truncating the value of a textual 
comparison.80 Still, it remains worth mentioning that, given the 
considerable restrictions on temporary worker unionization under 
 
compromise alternatives to organizing under Lee Hospital); cf. Malbaff Landscape, 
172 N.L.R.B. 128, 129 (1968) (“Section 8(a)(3) outlaws employer discrimination 
against employees. But an employer does not discriminate against employees 
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) by ceasing to do business with another 
employer because of the union or nonunion activity of the latter’s employees.”).  
 78.  See Mark D. Olivere, M.B. Sturgis and the NLRB’s Reevaluation of the 
Contingent Employee’s Ability to Unionize: Ramifications and Recommendations 
for the User Employer, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 151, 177 (recommending that 
employers seeking to limit the impact of M.B. Sturgis on labor costs terminate any 
and all contact with unionized private employment agencies); Recht, supra note 8, 
at 565–66 (reasoning that an employer can simultaneously limit its dealings with a 
unionized private staffing agency and behave in accordance with its obligations 
under the Act).  
 79.  See NLRB Update: Key NLRB Precedents Likely to Fall Under Liebman 
Board, FORD HARRISON LLP (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.fordharrison.com/5230 
(charting the predicted course of the Liebman Board on issues relevant to 
management); cf. Jeffrey Toobin, A Judicial Atrocity, NEW YORKER (Jan. 29, 
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/01/the-awful-
recess-appointment-ruling-in-canning-v-national-labor-relations-board.html 
(criticizing the D.C. Circuit’s recent ruling in Canning v. N.L.R.B. wherein the 
court struck down as unconstitutional President Obama’s recent appointments to 
the NLRB, thus placing current Board precedent in limbo and leaving the Board 
unable to achieve quorum).  
 80.  See generally ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 12, art. 2 (“Workers and 
employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, 
subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of 
their own choosing without previous authorisation.”). 
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Oakwood, the text of the decision appears irreconcilable with the 
broad, protective intent of Convention No. 87.81 Thankfully, the 
terminology of the Convention has been fleshed out at length by the 
Committee on Freedom of Association whose precedent gives effect 
to the vague language of the treaty.82 To determine whether current 
application of Section 9(b) is consistent with international labor law, 
this analysis will juxtapose the Board’s decision in Oakwood with 
CFA case law interpreting the three substantive clauses of 
Convention No. 87.83 
A. OAKWOOD CARE CENTER IS IRRECONCILABLE WITH THE 
COMMITTEE’S INTERPRETATION OF ILO CONVENTION NO. 87 
The “without distinction whatsoever” clause is indicative of the 
Convention’s comprehensive scope, and the ILO’s governing body 
has stated that the treaty applies to anyone earning a living through 
work.84 Specifically, the ILO prohibits distinction on the basis of 
employment status, finding that whether a worker is employed on a 
permanent basis, for a fixed term, or as a contract employee should 
bear no consequence on the right of that worker to join an 
organization of his or her choosing.85 The CFA has held repeatedly 
 
 81.  Compare id. (declaring that all workers must be capable of joining unions 
of their choosing as a matter of employee autonomy), with Oakwood Care Ctr., 
343 N.L.R.B. 659, 662 (2004) (holding that a jointly-employed temporary 
employee is statutorily prohibited from joining the bargaining unit of the user 
employer absent consent of the user and supplier employer, and that, should 
consent be withheld, the employee’s only recourse will be to organize the private 
employment agency).  
 82.  See, e.g., Digest of Decisions (2006), supra note 38, at 45, 59, 65 
(cataloging the Committee on Freedom of Association’s interpretative rulings 
relating to the “without distinction whatsoever,” “join organizations of their 
choosing,” and “without previous authorization” clauses of Article 2 of ILO 
Convention No. 87).  
 83.  See discussion, infra Part III.A.1–2; discussion, infra Part III.B.1–2; 
discussion, infra Part III.C.1 (juxtaposing the Board’s decision in Oakwood Care 
Center with CFA case law on the “without distinction whatsoever” clause, the 
“join organizations of their choosing” clause, and the “without previous 
authorization” clause to determine whether current interpretation of Section 9(b) of 
the Act is jurisprudentially consistent with Convention No. 87). 
 84.  ILO Report IV(1), supra note 39. 
 85.  See Digest of Decisions 2006, supra note 38, ¶ 255 (reading the “without 
distinction whatsoever” clause to prohibit differentially allocating protected rights 
on the basis of temporary employment status); see, e.g., ILO Report III (Part 4B), 
supra note 39, ¶ 45 (emphasizing that the freedom of association and right to 
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that the “status under which workers are engaged with the employer 
should not have any effect on their ability to join workers’ 
organizations and participate in their activities.”86 Further, signatories 
contravene the “without distinction whatsoever” clause by 
differentially allocating, on the basis of a protected category, Article 
2 rights in a manner that inhibits the full and free exercise of such 
rights.87 
1. CFA Case No. 2556 (Colombia) 
The right of workers to join, structure, and compose unions of 
their choosing without previous authorization cannot be withheld on 
the basis of occupational status. Emphasizing the broad applicability 
of the “without distinction whatsoever” clause of Convention No. 87, 
the Committee in CFA Case No. 2556 (Colombia) (“Colombia”) 
prohibited use of employment status as a factor upon which 
membership in a bargaining unit could be denied.88 In Colombia, the 
Union of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industry Workers alleged 
that by declining to register a union because its membership included 
temporary workers supplied by private employment agencies, 
 
organize should be guaranteed without discrimination of any kind as to race, sex, 
nationality, occupation, religion, or political opinion).  
 86.  See CFA Case No. 2556, supra note 12, ¶ 754 (“The Committee recalls in 
this regard that the status under which workers are engaged with the employer 
should not have any effect on their right to join workers’ organizations and 
participate in their activities. The Committee likewise recalls that all workers, 
without distinction whatsoever, whether they are employed on a permanent basis, 
for a fixed term or as contract employees, should have the right to establish and 
join organizations of their own choosing.”); CFA Case No. 2083, supra note 12, ¶ 
254 (“The Committee recalls in this regard that all public service workers other 
than those engaged in the administration of the State should enjoy collective 
bargaining rights . . . and that, according to the principles of freedom of 
association, staff having the status of contract employee should enjoy this right.”). 
 87.  See CFA Case No. 2083, supra note 12, ¶ 256 (recommending that the 
Canadian government amend the Public Service Labour Relations Act to ensure 
that temporary and casual workers have the same access to labor rights currently 
enjoyed by full time workers); cf. Digest of Decisions (2006), supra note 38, ¶ 209 
(stating that, as a matter of general principal, discrimination of any kind on the 
basis of sex, race, beliefs, political opinion, occupational status, or nationality will 
not be tolerated).  
 88.  See CFA Case No. 2556, supra note 12, ¶ 754 (recalling that the right to 
establish and join unions of one’s choosing as guaranteed by ILO Convention No. 
87 includes the broad ability of all workers, without distinction whatsoever, to 
structure and compose such unions). 
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Colombia’s Ministry of Social Protection had violated Convention 
No. 87.89 In response, the Colombian Government stated that the 
refusal was based on the fact that the proposed unit included both 
pharmaceutical workers and temporary workers from private 
employment agencies assigned to carry out functions of the 
pharmaceutical companies, thus impermissibly combining two 
separate industries.90 Finding for the Union, the Committee held that 
“the free exercise of the right to establish and join unions includes 
the free determination of the structure and composition of unions” 
and that this arrangement was in plain violation of the “join 
organizations of their choosing” clause.91 More importantly, the 
Committee utilized the “without distinction whatsoever” clause to 
uphold the indivisibility of the three clauses, reasoning that the right 
to join, structure, and compose unions without previous authorization 
cannot be withheld on the basis of occupational status.92 Therefore, a 
worker’s employment status should be legally irrelevant to that 
employee’s ability to lawfully join a trade union, and the Colombian 
Government was obligated to register the proposed unit of solely and 
temporarily employed workers.93 
There can be no doubt that the Board’s decision in Oakwood fails 
under the Colombia standard as an impermissible constraint on the 
right of workers to freely determine “the structure and composition 
 
 89.  See id. ¶¶ 749–51 (indicating that because the petitioned-for unit combined 
solely-employed employees of the user employer and jointly-employed employees 
of the supplier employer, the Ministry charged with approving units for bargaining 
denied the unit recognition, and refused to recognize its statutes and executive 
committee). 
 90.  See id. ¶ 750 (“[T]he refusal to register the organization in question as a 
trade union was due to the fact that the workers belonging to it do not work in 
enterprises from the same industry, as is required under article 356 of the 
Substantive Labour Code.”).  
 91.  See id. ¶ 754 (applying existing Committee precedent and ruling that the 
status under which workers are engaged with the employer shall have no effect on 
the right of such workers to join unions and take part in related activities).  
 92.  See id. (“In the present case, the workers should have the right to establish 
an industrial organization as they see fit . . . irrespective of the type of relationship 
they have with those companies.”). 
 93.  See id. ¶ 755 (inviting the Governing Body to recommend that the 
Colombian Government take necessary measures to approve the petitioned-for unit 
as proposed, and to keep the Committee informed of developments related to this 
matter). 
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of unions.”94 While the Oakwood decision does not foreclose entirely 
upon the possibility of temporary workers joining units of the user 
employer, the near impossibility of achieving requisite consent is 
well documented.95 The practical inability of temporary employee 
unionization under Oakwood runs afoul of the Committee’s rule that 
all workers, without distinction, must be free to establish and join 
unions of their choosing, and must be allowed to structure and 
compose such organizations as they see fit.96 
Moreover, the Colombian Government and the Board justified 
withholding recognition of the petitioned-for unit on identical 
grounds.97 Each reasoned that temporary workers supplied by private 
employment agencies could not be incorporated in the unit of the 
user employer because that would generate impermissible 
multiemployer bargaining, regardless of whether the temporary 
employees and the user employer’s workers were performing nearly 
 
 94.  Compare Digest of Decisions (2006), supra note 38, ¶ 333 (“The free 
exercise of the right to establish and join unions implies the free determination of 
the structure and composition of unions.”), with Oakwood Care Ctr., 334 N.L.R.B. 
659, 663 (2004) (holding that temporary workers supplied by private employment 
agencies can be excluded from the user employer’s bargaining unit on the basis of 
employment status so long as the employer does not consent to the arrangement). 
 95.  See Oakwood Care Ctr., 334 N.L.R.B. at 663–64 (reasoning that if 
temporary employees fail to achieve requisite consent under the dual-consent 
standard, such employees are still able to exercise protected trade union rights by 
organizing with other temporary employees employed by the private employment 
agency). But see discussion, supra Part II.C.3 (criticizing temporary employee 
unionization as envisioned by Lee Hospital and Oakwood as creating crippling 
legal and practical obstacles to pursuing either route discussed by the Oakwood 
majority).  
 96.  Compare Oakwood Care Ctr., 334 N.L.R.B. at 663 (prohibiting temporary 
employees from membership within the user employer’s unit absent employer 
consent), with CFA Case No. 2556, supra note 12, ¶ 754 (stating that “all workers, 
without distinction whatsoever, whether they are employed on a permanent basis, 
for a fixed term or as contract employees, should have the right to establish and 
join organizations of their own choosing” and to freely structure and compose such 
organizations). 
 97.  Compare Oakwood Care Ctr., 334 N.L.R.B. at 662 (refusing to approve 
the petitioned-for unit because the temporary employees were provided by a 
private employment agency, and thus combining them with the user employer’s 
employees would constitute impermissible multiemployer bargaining even though 
the employees performed similar work), with CFA Case No. 2556, supra note 12, ¶ 
750 (refusing to approve the petitioned-for unit because the workers operate in 
different industries, even though they both perform pharmaceutical work on behalf 
of the user employer). 
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identical tasks.98 The Committee expressly shunned this approach, 
holding instead that an employee’s employment status, whether 
temporary or permanent, cannot be used to deny membership in a 
bargaining unit.99 Oakwood unequivocally endorses the contrary and 
is plainly inconsistent with the Committee’s holding in Colombia.100 
2. CFA Case No. 2083 (Canada) 
Whether an employee operates on a temporary or permanent basis 
cannot support discriminatorily allocating rights guaranteed by 
convention No. 87 pursuant to the “without distinction whatsoever” 
clause. In 2000, the Canadian Labour Congress filed a complaint 
with the Committee alleging that New Brunswick’s Public Service 
Labour Relations Act (“PSLRA”) contravened Convention No. 87 by 
excluding temporary workers from the statutory definition of 
“employee.”101 As a result, temporary employees could not “avail 
themselves of the right to join unions of their own choosing or to 
bargain collectively, as was otherwise open to ‘employees’ under § 
25 of the [PLSRA]” and were susceptible to penalty for engaging in 
concerted activity.102 The Canadian government claimed that 
 
 98.  See Oakwood Care Ctr., 334 N.L.R.B at 662; CFA Case No. 2556, supra 
note 12, ¶ 750 (citing inclusion of workers operating under temporary employment 
status as the basis for denying recognition to the petitioned for unit). 
 99.  See CFA Case No. 2556, supra note 12, ¶ 754 (finding impermissible the 
use of employment status as a basis upon which employers and government can 
differentially allocate universally protected rights under Convention No. 87); see 
also ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Report in Which the Committee 
Requests to Be Kept Informed of Development, ¶ 592, Case No. 2301 (Malay.), 
Rep. No. 333 (Mar. 2004) [hereinafter CFA Case No. 2301] (emphasizing that it is 
for the workers themselves to decide whether to organize a union, how to structure 
that union, and how best to compose the union).  
 100.  See discussion, supra Part III.A.1 (applying the Committee’s holding in 
Colombia to the facts presented in Oakwood). 
 101.  See CFA Case No. 2083, supra note 12, ¶¶ 235, 240 (indicating that the 
Canadian Labour Congress and the Canadian Union of Public Employees filed this 
Complaint pursuant to existing Committee jurisprudence, holding that Article 2 of 
Convention No. 87 states that workers “without distinction whatsoever” should 
have the right to organize and that this right must be guaranteed without 
discrimination of any kind); cf. id. ¶ 237 (reviewing Canada’s general ratification 
record and finding that its parliament has ratified Convention No. 87). 
 102.  See id. ¶ 240 (reading prior Committee holdings to require that the 
statutory definition of “employee” be amended for temporary employees such that 
they too can enjoy rights and protections afforded by national labor law 
frameworks); see id. ¶¶ 241–42 (categorizing three separate issues raised by 
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temporary workers are “so fundamentally different from those 
regular employees” that the distinction included in the PSLRA was 
warranted, necessary, and consistent with Convention No. 87.103 
Finding for the Canadian Labour Congress, the Committee 
rejected the Government’s reasoning, holding instead that the 
statutory exclusion of temporary employees violated the “without 
distinction whatsoever” clause of Convention No. 87, which 
prohibits differential allocation of protected rights on the basis of 
employment status.104 The scope of Convention No. 87 cannot be 
limited on the basis of employment status, and whether an employee 
operates on a fixed or permanent term cannot support 
discriminatorily allocating the right of all workers to join 
organizations of their choosing without previous authorization.105 
 
differential treatment of temporary workers: (1) plain fact that under PSLRA 
temporary workers are denied the ability to organize and bargain collectively; (2) 
potential for reprisals for temporary employees engaging in otherwise protected 
union activity; and (3) lack of ability to enter into enforceable collective 
agreements). 
 103.  See CFA Case No. 2083, supra note 12, ¶¶ 246, 254 (interpreting the 
government’s argument to find dispositive the fact that temporary employees are 
so different in their terms of employment that the distinction is reasonable as found 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in the 1980s). 
 104.  See id. ¶¶ 250–55 (“Given these statutory definitions, at the very least, 
casual workers could not join public service employee organizations because they 
are not ‘employees’ within the meaning of the PSLRA. On the basis of available 
evidence, the Committee can therefore only conclude that casual workers cannot 
join organizations of their own choosing, and enjoy the various related rights.”); id. 
¶ 253 (“The Committee recalls that all workers, without distinction whatsoever, 
whether they are employed on a permanent basis, for a fixed term, or as contract 
employees, should have the right to establish and join organizations of their own 
choosing.”); see also ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 12, art. 2 (authorizing 
workers and employers, “without distinction whatsoever,” to establish and join 
organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization). 
 105.  See CFA Case No. 2083, supra note 12, ¶¶ 252–53 (recalling that both 
denying a protected right to temporary workers that regular workers enjoy and 
denying a protected right to public employees that private sector employees enjoy 
are instances of prohibited discrimination plainly in violation of the “without 
distinction whatsoever” clause of Article 2 of Convention No. 87); see also ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association, Report in Which the Committee Requests 
to Be Kept Informed of Development, ¶¶ 845–46, Case No. 2158 (India), Rep. No. 
330, (Mar. 2003) [hereinafter CFA Case No. 2158] (ruling that “the status under 
which workers are engaged with the employer . . . should not have any effect on 
their right to join workers’ organizations,” and holding that temporary employees 
could not be denied a statutory right to appeal a dismissal afforded to regular 
employees on the basis of employment status). 
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Parallels between Canada and Oakwood are clear and 
transferable.106 Acting on the assumption that temporary workers are 
“so fundamentally different from regular employees,” the Canadian 
Government differentially allocated access to fundamental labor 
rights guaranteed by the Convention.107 Similarly, the Board in 
Oakwood differentiated on the basis of temporary employment 
status, requiring temporary workers satisfy a higher Section 9(b) 
burden than long-term employees.108 In Canada, the ILO squarely 
rejects this, unequivocally mandating that the right to free association 
be granted uniformly, without distinction or discrimination 
whatsoever as to temporary occupational status.109 In light of the 
Committee’s broad interpretation of the “without distinction 
whatsoever” clause, it is clear that the Oakwood decision fails to pass 
muster under the Canada standard.110 
 
 106.  See Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. 659, 660–62 (2004) (addressing the 
issue of whether, pursuant to Section 9(b) of the Act, jointly-employed temporary 
employees can be forced to achieve the consent of the user and supplier employer 
when fulltime solely-employed workers have no such obligation); cf. CFA Case 
No. 2083, supra note 12, ¶¶ 250–56 (considering whether the Canadian 
government can, consistent with ILO Convention No. 87, deny temporary workers 
in the public service the right to organize and collectively bargain when the right is 
enjoyed by both regular public sector employees and temporary employees in the 
private sector).  
 107.  See CFA Case No. 2083, supra note 12, ¶¶ 247, 249 (observing that the 
circumstances of temporary employees are “quite different from those of regular 
public service employees” and that this fundamental difference in terms and 
conditions of employment warrants the “definitional distinction” in the PSLRA).  
 108.  See Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. at 662 (reconsidering M.B. Sturgis 
and upholding differential standards for temporary workers because jointly-
employed temporary employees have their terms and conditions of employment set 
by both the user and the supplier employer, while the solely-employed regular 
workers have their terms and conditions of employment set by the user employer 
alone).  
 109.  See CFA Case No. 2083, supra note 12, ¶ 253 (recalling that all workers, 
“whether they are employed on a permanent basis, for a fixed term, or as contract 
employees,” must be capable of exercising the right to establish and join unions of 
their own choosing). 
 110.  Compare id. ¶ 254 (holding that pursuant to the “without distinction 
whatsoever” clause, the PSLRA must be amended such that temporary workers 
currently excluded from the statutory definition of employees are afforded the 
same rights to unionize and bargain collectively as currently enjoyed by ordinary 
employees as defined in the statute), with Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. at 663 
(requiring temporary workers satisfy a burden not imposed on regular workers 
before they can access rights otherwise guaranteed by Convention No. 87).  
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B. THE OAKWOOD DECISION CANNOT BE SQUARED WITH THE 
COMMITTEE’S INTERPRETATION OF ILO CONVENTION NO. 87 
Interpreting the “join organizations of their choosing” clause, the 
CFA has held unequivocally that all workers shall possess full 
freedom to choose amongst unions, and that such freedom must be 
“fully established and respected in law and in fact.”111 Mere textual 
compliance is insufficient; free choice must be practically 
exercisable and absolute autonomy is required.112 Any scenario in 
which “an individual is denied any possibility of choice between 
different organizations” is irreconcilable with the intent of the 
Convention.113 Beyond condemning outright prohibitions on 
employee choice, the CFA reads the “join organizations of their 
choosing” clause to incorporate, consistent with principles of free 
exercise, the right to determine how to organize, structure, and 
compose unions as necessary to maximize representative capacity.114 
1. CFA Case No. 1615 (Philippines) 
The “join organizations of their own choosing” clause prohibits 
any situation in which workers are denied the possibility of choice 
amongst different workers’ organizations. According the Committee, 
 
 111.  See ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Interim Report, ¶ 1353, 
Case No. 2388 (Ukr.), Rep. No. 337 (2005); CFA Case No. 2301, supra note 99, ¶ 
592 (“The right of workers to establish and join organizations of their own 
choosing . . . cannot be said to exist unless such freedom is fully established and 
respected in law and in fact.”). 
 112.  See Digest of Decisions (2006), supra note 38, ¶ 310 (indicating that the 
“join organizations of their own choosing” clause of Convention No. 87 requires 
that workers must be able to exercise this right in full freedom and that any law 
that suppresses the ability to exercise this right in practice will contravene the 
Convention regardless of whether it comports textually). 
 113.  Compare Fonseca, supra note 8, at 190, and Rahebi, supra note 7, at 
1113–15, and Recht, supra note 158, at 565–66, 585–86 (concluding that Lee 
Hospital and Oakwood left jointly-employed temporary workers with only one 
possible way to organize that was practically impossible to execute), with Digest of 
Decisions (2006), supra note 38, ¶ 324 (“A situation in which an individual is 
denied any possibility of choice between different organizations . . . is 
incompatible with the principles embodied in Convention No. 87.”). 
 114.  See ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Report in Which the 
Committee Requests to Be Kept Informed of Development, ¶ 681, Case No. 2115 
(Mex.), Rep. No. 327 (2002) [hereinafter CFA Case No. 2115] (recalling that “the 
free exercise of the right to establish and join trade unions implies the free 
determination of the structure and composition of unions”). 
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the “join organizations of their own choosing” clause prohibits any 
situation in which a worker “is denied any possibility of choice 
between different organizations.”115 This principle was upheld in 
CFA Case No. 1615 (Philippines) (“Philippines”), where the 
Committee attempted to square Policy Instruction No. 20, which 
required temporary workers to join a particular bargaining unit, with 
precedent requiring that employee autonomy must exist in both law 
and in fact.116 The International Federation of Building and Wood 
Workers (“IFBWW”) alleged that the dismissal of temporary 
workers for attempting to join a bargaining unit not endorsed by 
Policy Instruction No. 20 violated Convention No. 87.117 The 
Committee held that Policy Instruction No. 20 contravened 
Convention No. 87 by preventing fixed-term workers “from 
organizing at the enterprise level . . . and by authorizing them only to 
join the recognized trade union.”118 
Oakwood fails to comply with the “join organizations of their own 
choosing” clause as interpreted in Philippines because the Board’s 
interpretation of Section 9(b) interferes with the free association of 
temporary workers “inasmuch as it prevents them from organizing at 
the enterprise level” and by “authorizing them only to join the 
recognized trade union.”119 By conditioning membership in the user 
 
 115.  See Digest of Decisions (2006), supra note 38, ¶ 324 (declaring any 
scenario wherein legislation denies a worker any possibility of choice amongst 
different organizations as inconsistent with the Convention). 
 116.  See ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Report in Which the 
Committee Requests to Be Kept Informed of Development, ¶¶ 316–17, Case No. 
1615 (Phil.), Rep. No. 292 (Mar. 1994) (discussing the committee’s previous 
examination of the case and describing the IFBWW’s complaint that Policy 
Instruction No. 20 contravenes the freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights of temporary workers in violation of Convention No. 87).  
 117.  See id. ¶¶ 313–17 (alleging that temporary workers had been improperly 
dismissed for violating Policy Instruction No. 20 when, in fact, the strike was legal 
since Policy Instruction No. 20 is an unfair labor practice). 
 118.  See id. ¶¶ 327–28 (“In the Committee’s opinion, Policy Instruction No. 20 
interferes with the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining to 
fixed-term project workers, inasmuch as it prevents them from organizing at the 
enterprise level with a view to setting up a bargaining unit.”). 
 119.  Compare Rahebi, supra note 7, at 1113–15 (explaining why it is important 
for temporary workers to have access to unions), and Fonseca, supra note 8, at 
172–73 (noting that while the number of temporary workers grows, they often are 
still denied benefits as employers misclassify them as “independent contractors,” 
precluding them from the benefits of unionization), with Digest of Decisions 
(2006), supra note 38, ¶ 324 (prohibiting situations where an employee is denied 
  
2014] UNIONIZING THE CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 495 
employer’s unit on dual consent, Oakwood impermissibly limits 
employee choice, and clearly runs afoul of the Committee’s 
command that the right to establish and join organizations must be 
fully available in law and in fact.120 The Committee has noted that 
any situation “in which an individual is denied any possibility of 
choice between different organizations . . . is incompatible with the 
principles embodied in Convention No. 87.”121 Given that employers 
acting pursuant to Oakwood have every incentive to withhold 
requisite consent, jointly-employed temporary workers are left only 
with the option of organizing the private employment agency, an 
arrangement that—because it is impractical and exists in isolation—
contravenes Convention No. 87.122 
2. CFA Case No. 2115 (Mexico) 
Full and free exercise of the right to join unions implies the 
unqualified right to determine the structure and composition of those 
unions. The Committee’s ruling in CFA Case No. 2115 (Mexico) 
(“Mexico”) stands for the proposition that the right to join unions 
autonomously under the “join organizations of their own choosing” 
clause incorporates the right to freely structure and compose those 
very unions.123 In Mexico, a Mexican construction union attempted to 
open its membership to temporary, casual, and aspiring workers in a 
variety of construction-related fields by amending its bylaws.124 The 
 
any possibility of choice between organizations). 
 120.  Cf. Digest of Decisions (2006), supra note 38, ¶¶ 309–10 (“The right of 
worker to establish and join organizations of their own choosing . . . cannot be said 
to exist unless such freedom is fully established in law and in fact.”). 
 121.  See id. ¶ 324 (“A situation in which an individual is denied any possibility 
of choice between different organizations, by reason of the fact that the legislation 
permits the existence of only one organization in the area in which the individual 
carries on his or her occupation, is incompatible with the principles embodied in 
Convention No. 87.”). 
 122.  See M.B. Sturgis, Inc. 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1298 (2000) (reasoning that 
under Lee Hospital, which was ultimately reaffirmed in Oakwood, temporary 
workers are effectively prohibited from organizing at the user employer level); cf. 
Rahebi, supra note 7, at 1113–15 (analyzing temporary employee organizing under 
Lee Hospital, and concluding that bargaining as conceptualized in that decision, 
and as ultimately reaffirmed in Oakwood, is impractical).  
 123.  See CFA Case No. 2115, supra note 114, ¶ 681 (“The Committee recalls in 
this connection that the free exercise of the right to establish and join trade unions 
implies the free determination of the structure and composition of unions.”). 
 124.  See id. ¶ 667 (proposing an amendment to expand union membership).  
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Ministry of Labour and Social Security declined to register the 
proposed amendment, and the union sought relief at the ILO for what 
it perceived as a violation of Convention No. 87.125 
Finding for the union, the Committee urged the Mexican 
government to ensure that workers had the right to freely structure 
and compose unions pursuant to the “join organizations of their own 
choosing” clause.126 Given that Oakwood categorically limits the 
membership of bargaining units in practice, it is clear that the 
decision fails to adhere to the broad recognition of worker autonomy 
as evidenced in the Mexico decision and Convention No. 87 itself.127 
C. THE OAKWOOD DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH COMMITTEE 
INTERPRETATION OF ILO CONVENTION NO. 87 
The “without previous authorization” clause was originally 
included in the Convention to guard against arrangements in which a 
decision-maker brandished unbridled discretion as to membership 
determinations, for which his basis may have been entirely 
arbitrary.128 These scenarios are however, uncommon, and the 
preponderance of relevant CFA case law interpreting this clause 
 
 125.  See id. ¶¶ 668–69 (alleging that the Ministry’s refusal to register the 
amendment was in violation of the Convention No. 87). 
 126.  See id. ¶ 681 (recalling that the right to freely determine the structure and 
composition of unions is strictly within the purview of workers pursuant to the 
“join organizations of their own choosing” clause, and recommending the Mexican 
government take measures to ensure this principle is reflected in national labor 
law). 
 127.  Compare id. (reading the “join organizations of their own choosing” clause 
to incorporate the right to include in a membership whom the membership deems 
suitable, thus striking down the Mexican government’s attempt to dictate who can 
participate in a single union), with Oakwood Care Ctr., 343 N.L.R.B. 659, 663 
(2004) (limiting the right of employees to join organizations of their own choosing 
and compose those organizations accordingly by requiring temporary workers to 
achieve dual employer consent before joining the user employer’s unit). 
 128.  See ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Report in Which the 
Committee Requests to Be Kept Informed of Development, ¶ 380, Case No. 2225 
(Bosn. & Herz.), Rep No. 332 (Nov. 2003) [hereinafter CFA Case No. 2225] 
(finding that a government agency that unjustifiably refuses to register a trade 
union is out of compliance with Convention No. 87 pursuant to the “without 
previous authorization” clause); see also Digest of Decisions (2006), supra note 
38, ¶ 273 (“A law providing that the right of association is subject to authorization 
granted by a government department purely in its discretion is incompatible with 
the principle of freedom of association.”). 
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addresses legislatively or judicially imposed formalities or 
prerequisites to unionization.129 Although the ILO has recognized 
that governments may impose administrative formalities on 
unionization, it has stated that such formalities will contravene the 
Convention when they are “of such nature as to impair the free 
establishment of organizations” or operate in practice as an outright 
prohibition on unionization.130 For example, requiring employees to 
navigate a convoluted and arbitrary union accreditation process is 
considered tantamount to obtaining prior consent to unionize in 
violation of the “without previous authorization” clause.131 To 
determine whether a state-imposed prerequisite passes muster before 
the ILO, the CFA engages in a balancing test, comparing the state’s 
interest in its registration scheme to the employees’ ability to fully 
and freely join organizations of their choosing pursuant to that 
scheme.132 
 
 129.  See, e.g., ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Report in Which the 
Committee Requests to Be Kept Informed of Development, ¶ 1056, Case No. 2346 
(Mex.), Rep. No. 337 (June 2005); ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, 
Report in Which the Committee Requests to Be Kept Informed of Development, ¶ 
200, Case No. 2327 (Bangl.), Rep. No. 337 (June 2005); ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association, Report in Which the Committee Requests to Be Kept 
Informed of Development, ¶ 778, Case No. 2079 (Ukr.), Rep. No. 329 (Nov. 2002) 
(“Recalling that the founders of a trade union should comply with the formalities 
prescribed by legislation but that these formalities should not be of such a nature as 
to impair the free establishment of organizations.”). 
 130.  Compare Digest of Decisions (2006), supra note 38, ¶ 272 (encouraging 
trade unionists to observe formalities and prerequisites to unionization as 
proscribed by law), with id. ¶ 276 (“Although the founders of a trade union should 
comply with the formalities proscribed by legislation, these formalities should not 
be of such a nature as to impair the free establishment of organizations.”). 
 131.  See BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ ET AL., supra note 26, at 184–85 (indicating 
that such formalities equate to impermissible prior authorization when they are 
long, complicated, or applied in a manner inconsistent with their purpose). 
 132.  See, e.g., CFA Case No. 2225, supra note 128, ¶ 377 (“While the founders 
of an organization are not freed from the duty of observing formalities which may 
be prescribed by law, such requirements must not be such as to be equivalent in 
practice to previous authorization, or as to constitute such an obstacle to the 
establishment of an organization that they amount in practice to outright 
prohibition.”); Digest of Decisions (2006), supra note 38, ¶¶ 272–73, 276, 279 
(indicating the factors considered in determining whether prerequisites or 
formalities created impermissible “previous authorization” to unionizing).  
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1. CFA Case No. 2675 (Peru) 
National labor law violates the “without previous authorization” 
clause when it is applied inconsistently with principles of free 
association such as to limit access to rights otherwise guaranteed 
under Convention No. 87. In CFA Case No. 2675 (Peru) (“Peru”), 
the General Confederation of Workers of Peru complained that 
Article 32 of Act No. 22342, which authorized industrial companies 
dealing in non-traditional exports to execute very short-term 
employment contracts, unfairly prejudiced the ability of temporary 
workers to freely exercise trade union rights.133 According to the 
Complaint, temporary workers avoided engaging in union activity 
for fear that short term contracts would not be renewed.134 The 
Peruvian Government admitted that the practice was commonly used 
to discourage trade union membership in clear violation of binding 
ILO instruments.135 Importantly, the Committee noted that even 
absent discriminatory intent, a law contravenes international labor 
law if its impact, in practice, extinguishes a temporary worker’s 
ability to exercise rights under Convention No. 87.136 The Committee 
found this arrangement to be in violation of the “without previous 
authorization” clause, holding that the systematic use of short-term 
contracts presented “an obstacle to the exercise of trade union 
rights.”137 
Accordingly, the Committee recognizes two classes of violations 
committable against the “without previous authorization” clause: 
those in which unchecked discretion is vested in a government 
 
 133.  See ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Report in Which the 
Committee Requests to Be Kept Informed of Development, ¶¶ 839–47, Case No. 
2675 (Peru), Rep. No. 357 (June 2010) (alleging that Article 32 of Decree Law No. 
22342 violates Conventions No. 87 and 98 as applied to temporary and contract 
workers). 
 134.  See id. ¶ 839 (reasoning that given the nature of short-term contracts, 
temporary employees are hesitant to exercise otherwise protected trade union 
rights for fear that such behavior will induce management to decide against 
renewal). 
 135.  See id. ¶ 873 (“The Government also states in general, in the sector in 
question that ‘temporary contracts have been used repeatedly as a means of 
discouraging trade union membership.’”).  
 136.  See id. ¶ 875 (inviting the government to examine ways to protect against 
practical obstacles to exercising trade union rights as produced by the systematic 
use of very short term employment contracts.) 
 137.  See id.  
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authority, and those in which national law limits the free 
establishment of workers’ organizations.138 The Oakwood decision is 
a clear example of both. In Oakwood, the Board implemented 
different standards on the basis of employment status by heightening, 
to a level of impracticality, the requisite Section 9(b) 
“appropriateness” showing for temporary workers.139 While the 
Oakwood standard may have been implemented to protect against 
fragmented bargaining, it has operated as an outright prohibition on 
the right of temporary employees to unionize.140 This fact, combined 
with the unqualified right of employers to veto temporary employee 
organizing under Oakwood, makes it clear that the decision institutes 
unachievable prerequisites to unionizing in violation of the “without 
previous authorization” clause. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THE U.S. SENATE SHOULD RATIFY AND IMPLEMENT ILO 
CONVENTION 181 INTO THE NATIONAL LABOR LAW FRAMEWORK 
Achieving compliance with international labor law requires the 
U.S. Senate to ratify ILO Convention No. 181 on Private 
Employment Agencies and Congress to implement its protective 
measures into the national labor law framework.141 Convention No. 
 
 138.  See, e.g., Digest of Decisions (2006), supra note 38, ¶¶ 273, 276 (warning 
members that any union recognition process that either affords a government 
department unqualified discretion to make accreditation determinations or, in 
practice, impairs the free establishment of workers’ organizations will be out of 
compliance with the Convention).  
 139.  See Recht, supra note 8 (suggesting that Oakwood creates a legal 
underclass of employees who face insurmountable barriers to unionizing that are 
not imposed on other types of workers).  
 140.  See discussion, supra Part II.C (discussing the impracticality of temporary 
employee unionization under Oakwood). 
 141.  See generally ILO Convention (No. 181) Concerning Private Employment 
Agencies, June 19, 1997, 2115 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 
181] (recognizing the legitimacy of private employment agencies and condoning 
their existence in the international labor market on the condition that such agencies 
afford employees certain rights and protections with respect to their employment); 
ILO Recommendation No. 188 Private Employment Agencies Recommendation, 
June 19, 1997, 85th ILC Sess., available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p 
=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:R188 (supplementing ILO Convention 
No. 181 with technical assistance, definitional clarification, best practice 
methodology, and general advice on proper implementation). 
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181 represents a significant departure from traditional international 
labor regulation in that, for the first time, the ILO recognized—albeit 
cautiously—the inevitability and legitimacy of private labor market 
intermediaries whose sole purpose is the sale of labor as a 
commodity.142 The Convention adapts to globalized employment by 
promoting managerial flexibility and publicly condoning the 
operation of private employment agencies, and by combatting 
statutory under-inclusion of temporary workers and deliberate 
mischaracterization of employees by employers looking to avoid 
obligations under national labor law.143 
The triangular employment relationship is expressly covered under 
Article 1(1) of the Convention.144 Of significant consequence for 
U.S. compliance is Article 4, which unequivocally requires member 
states to take measures to “ensure that the workers recruited by 
private employment agencies . . . are not denied the right to freedom 
of association and the right to bargain collectively.”145 Further, 
Article 11 guarantees that workers employed by private employment 
 
 142.  See Frances Raday, The Insider-Outsider Politics of Labor-Only 
Contracting, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 413, 413–14 (1998) (“The historic 
stance of the ILO was to oppose private labor market intermediaries, as such, on 
the grounds that they would undermine the principle that ‘labour is not a 
commodity.’ In 1997, in Convention 181, the ILO reversed this policy and 
legitimized private intermediaries, not only as job-placement agencies, but also as 
direct providers of labor services.”).  
 143.  See Private Employment Agencies, Temporary Agency Workers and Their 
Contribution to the Labour Market 5–8 (Int’l Labour Org., Issue Paper WPEAC-
2009, 2009), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_ 
dialogue/---sector/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_162740.pdf; Jan Theron, 
Intermediary or Employer? Labour Brokers and the Triangular Employment 
Relationship, 26 INDUS. L.J. 618, 618–19 (2005) (balancing the modern 
employer’s need for flexibility with the contingent worker’s need for safe, stable, 
and statutorily recognized employment); Raday, supra note 142, at 413 (indicating 
that the historic stance of the ILO on the impermissibility of private employment 
agencies could not be squared with globalization’s impact on the employment 
relationship and that, to stay relevant in the international law community, the ILO 
had no choice but the condone the existence of private labor intermediaries). 
 144.  See ILO Convention No. 181, supra note 141, art. 1(1)(b) (defining 
“private employment agency” to include “services consisting of employing 
workers with a view to making them available to a third party . . . which assigns 
their tasks and supervises the execution of these tasks”).  
 145.  See id. art. 4 (“Measures shall be taken to ensure that the workers recruited 
by private employment agencies providing the services referred to in Article 1 are 
not denied the right to freedom of association and the right to bargain 
collectively.”).  
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agencies must be, in practice, adequately protected as to the freedom 
of association, the right to collective bargaining, minimum wages, 
proper working conditions, and several other categories.146 
Convention No. 181 more precisely addresses the vulnerabilities of 
temporary workers in triangular employment relationships as 
compared to comprehensive yet generally worded protections 
afforded by Convention No. 87.147 By ratifying Convention No. 181, 
the United States could remove practical obstacles to unionizing 
imposed by the Oakwood decision, achieve compliance with binding 
international obligations, and guarantee the fundamental rights of 
free association and collective bargaining to all workers.148 
B. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD SHOULD OVERRULE 
OAKWOOD AND RETURN TO SETTLED SECTION 9(B) 
JURISPRUDENCE RELATING TO TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES UNDER 
M.B. STURGIS 
By replacing the traditional “community of interest” test with the 
dual consent requirement, the Board in Oakwood disrupted decades 
of settled precedent governing Section 9(b) propriety 
determinations.149 For the reasons discussed in Part III, the Board’s 
current application of Section 9(b) to temporary workers pursuant to 
Oakwood plainly contravenes the United States’ international 
commitments by imposing crippling legal and practical obstacles to 
 
 146.  See id. art. 11 (ensuring adequate protection for temporary workers with 
respect to free association, collective bargaining, minimum wages, hours, benefits, 
training, workplace safety, workers compensation, and parental benefits).  
 147.  Compare id. art. 1(1)(b) (specifying coverage under the act to include 
employees in a triangular employment relationship), with ILO Convention No. 87, 
supra note 12, art. 2 (covering generally all workers “without distinction 
whatsoever”).  
 148.  Cf. Rahebi, supra note 7, at 1113–15 (analyzing the practical obstacles to 
unionization created by the Oakwood decision). Compare ILO Convention No. 
181, supra note 141, arts. 4, 11 (requiring both legal and practical access to trade 
union rights for employees of private employment agencies in triangular 
employment relationships), with Oakwood Care Ctr., 334 N.L.R.B. 659, 663 
(2004) (holding that jointly-employed temporary employees of private 
employment agencies in triangular employment relationships cannot, consistent 
with Section 9(b) of the Act, unionize with core employees of the user employer 
absent consent of the user employer and the private employment agency).  
 149.  See discussion, supra Part II.C.3 (comparing scholarship on the Oakwood 
decision to determine how significant of an impact the decision had on traditional 
Section 9(b) appropriateness precedent).  
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full and free exercise of trade union rights.150 To comply with 
international law, the Board should expressly overrule Oakwood and 
reinstitute the exclusivity of the “community of interest” test 
previously upheld in M.B. Sturgis as the determinative methodology 
for unit propriety.151 
Under M.B. Sturgis, all workers, regardless of employment status, 
have uniform prerequisites to unionization, none of which 
unnecessarily inhibit a temporary worker’s access thereto.152 So long 
as a petitioned-for unit is composed of mutually interested workers, 
the unit will be considered “appropriate” under Section 9(b) of the 
Act.153 Whether employers consent to the arrangement is of no legal 
consequence.154 The M.B. Sturgis regime complies with the three 
substantive clauses of Article 2(2) Convention No. 87 in that all 
workers, “without distinction whatsoever,” must demonstrate 
uniform criteria to unionize and can, upon sufficient showing of 
mutuality, “join organizations of their choosing freely and “without 
 
 150.  See discussion, supra Part III.A–B (critiquing the Oakwood decision 
against international legal obligations pursuant to Convention No. 87).  
 151.  Cf. discussion, supra Part II.C (describing how to properly undertake a 
traditional Section 9(b) community of interest analysis with respect to temporary 
employees, and listing the factors considered determinative of mutuality). 
Compare Oakwood Care Ctr., 334 N.L.R.B at 663 (holding that for jointly 
employed temporary workers to join a bargaining unit consisting of solely-
employed employees of the user employer, the temporary worker must first 
achieve sufficient mutuality of interest and then attain consent from both the 
supplier and user employer), with M.B. Sturgis, Inc. 331 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1305–06 
(2000) (holding that a jointly-employed temporary worker need only show 
sufficient mutuality of interest to join a bargaining unit with solely employed 
employees of the user employer).  
 152.  See M.B. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1308 (ruling that the Board “will apply 
traditional community of interest factors” to determine whether units that combine 
jointly-employed and solely-employed employees of a user employer are 
appropriate for purposes of Section 9(b)); see also Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 
329 (6th Cir. 1966) (“The touchstone of an appropriate bargaining unit is the 
finding that all of its members have a common interest in the terms and conditions 
of employment, to warrant their inclusion in a single unit to choose a bargaining 
agent.”); cf. Dougherty, supra note 44, at 16 (cataloging factors considered in a 
Section 9(b) community of interest analysis).  
 153.  See M.B. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1305–06 (holding that the “community 
of interest” test applies and is determinative in a Section 9(b) “appropriateness” 
determination). 
 154.  See id. at 1304–05 (declining to accept the “faulty logic” of Lee Hospital 
and holding that the “Board does not require ‘consent’ of the employer in order for 
employees to be represented for collective bargaining in an employer-wide unit.”).  
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previous authorization.”155 
V. CONCLUSION 
As a matter of international labor law, Oakwood was wrongly 
decided. Conditioning the freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining on employer consent impermissibly limits the 
full and free exercise of guaranteed rights. The ILO squarely rejects 
this arrangement and consequently, Section 9(b) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, as applied to temporary employees, does not 
comply with ILO Convention No. 87. 
 
 
 155.  Compare id. at 1305–07 (holding generally that jointly-employed 
temporary workers should be subject to the same prerequisites as solely-employed 
employees under Section 9(b)), with ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 12, art. 2 
(requiring that all workers, without distinction whatsoever, be afforded the right to 
organize in workers’ organizations of their own choosing without previous 
authorization).  
